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Abstract
We investigate how the patterns of consumption and accumulation, as
well as the patterns of time allocation and of social interaction, may be
inﬂuenced by ‘social pressure’, i.e., by the choices of others. We display an
evolutionary model involving several generations of interacting individu-
als, in which diﬀerent patterns may coexist in equilibrium and in which
path dependence and critical mass eﬀects play an important role. Bomze’s
(1983) classiﬁcation is used to study the properties of this game. We ﬁnd
that ‘social pressure’ may lead to ‘low welfare traps’ with overwork and
overconsumption, and that policy may have a role as a coordination de-
vice.
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21 Introduction
This paper represents a further step in a line of research that investigates how
negative externalities may function as a push factor in the processes of economic
growth, that is, as an ‘engine’ of economic growth. The mechanism through
which negative externalities can fuel economic growth is very simple: individ-
uals who are victims of negative externalities have, in many cases, the chance
of alleviating the damage by increasing their consumption of private goods;
growth of private consumption, in turn, may generate an increase in negative
externalities and may therefore generate further victims who resort to consump-
tion of private goods for self-protection. Such a mechanism may therefore be
self-enforcing. This line of research can be subdivided in two strands, according
to whether the main focus is on negative externalities of private production on
the natural environment, as in Antoci and Bartolini (1997, 1999 and 2004) and
Antoci and Borghesi (2001), or on the social environment, as in Antoci, Sacco
and Vanin (2005 and 2006). The result that these works have in common is
that when economic growth is fuelled by negative externalities, it may be unde-
sirable; that is, economic agents’ well-being would be greater if they consumed
fewer private goods and accumulated less physical capital.
This paper may be seen as a further contribution to the second strand of this
line of research. It takes the view that social environment matters for individual
well-being and it investigates how the patterns of social interaction may change
in response to agents’ economic choices and how, in turn, they may inﬂuence
those same choices. In particular, it focuses on choices of time allocation be-
tween production and leisure and of goods allocation between consumption and
accumulation and it argues that such choices may be strongly conditioned by
‘social pressure’ (that is, by the choices of others). This implies that economic
dynamics may exhibit path dependence and critical mass eﬀects, in the sense
that, for instance, a given pattern of capital accumulation may be selected if the
proportion of individuals initially choosing it is high enough. As a consequence
such pattern may become an expected, customary and self-enforcing status of
things - that is, it may emerge as a social convention in the sense of Lewis
(1969).
We investigate how such a social convention may emerge and we take the
view that this process involves several generations. One after the other, and
looking at past experience but also experimenting new strategies, generations
slowly adopt those patterns of consumption and accumulation, of time alloca-
tion and of social interaction that turn out to be most rewarding. This process
has one diﬃculty, though, and this is where ‘social pressure’ comes into the
picture, since what is more rewarding depends on what other people do. There-
fore, the process of gradual adoption of more rewarding strategies may lead to
overall suboptimal choices if an high enough fraction of the population behaves
initially in a ‘wrong’ way, thereby conditioning the rest of the population to
respond to such behavior, rather than choosing what would otherwise be the
more rewarding strategy.
We model this process in terms of an evolutionary dynamics involving sev-
3eral generations of interacting individuals. We ﬁnd that diﬀerent equilibria may
emerge depending on initial conditions and critical masses, and that in the
emerging equilibria diﬀerent strategies may coexist. This means that the pop-
ulation of our economy may behave heterogeneously in equilibrium. We then
discuss the welfare properties of the equilibria and argue that in some (but not
in all) cases there is a scope for policy intervention, since sub-optimality is the
consequence of a coordination failure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
concept of relational goods, which captures returns to socially enjoyed leisure,
and the possible substitution of private goods for relational goods. Section 3
displays and analyzes the model, its dynamic properties and its policy implica-
tions. Section 4 concludes.
2 Relational goods and self-protection
As mentioned above, we consider social environment relevant for individual well-
being. While such relevance may in principle take several forms, we are going to
focus on the returns to social interaction in terms of relational goods. Relational
goods are goods that cannot be enjoyed alone, since they can only be produced
and consumed by participating to some common activity with other agents. For
concreteness, think of the return to the time spent with friends or participating
to a choir, a football club, a voluntary organization, and so on, or of what distin-
guishes a dinner alone from the same dinner in good company. Uhlaner (1989),
who introduced the concept of relational goods among economists, emphasizes
the relevance of joint participation. Indeed, relational goods may be seen as a
special case Cornes and Sandler’s (1984) joint production model.
The mixed private-public good approach1 of the joint production model has
interesting implications in terms of crowding in and of multiple equilibria, since
it may display strategic complementarity in private contribution to the joint
production. This means that if everybody else contributes much, this raises my
private returns from contribution and therefore leads me to contribute much
myself, but if other people’s contribution is low, I may have no incentive to
contribute much. Uhlaner applies this general result to the case of relational
goods and emphasizes that an increase in the number of participants to the
common activity may increase individual utility. One consequence of these
features is that, due to coordination failure, participation to those activities
that generate relational goods may be ineﬃciently low. In the present context
we are going to consider in broad terms socially enjoyed leisure as the activity
that generates relational goods, arguing that, even if interaction at work may
be another source of relational goods, the ﬁrst engine of most work relationships
is private rather than relational, and it seems to be a good ﬁrst approximation
to consider the returns to work in terms of private goods and the returns to
1Observe that relational goods are an intermediate case between private and public goods:
like public goods, they display relevant aspects of non-rivalry in consumption; like private
goods, their consumption depends to a substantial degree upon own contribution.
4socially enjoyed leisure in terms of relational goods. In Cooper and John’s
(1988) terminology, we are going to display a model in which, due to the role
of social interaction, average leisure has positive spillovers. When a society gets
stuck in a Pareto-dominated equilibrium with ineﬃciently low socially enjoyed
leisure, we may speak of a ‘social poverty trap’.
In several cases, individuals may defend themselves from a situation of social
poverty by increasing their private consumption. If I try to share some activity
with other people but they work too much and do not have time, I may react in
a number of ways, which include devoting more time to television, eating more
as a form of aﬀective compensation, looking for private services that substitute
for the interaction opportunities that are no longer available outside the market
(e.g., marriage agencies, ‘singles’ bars, virtual dating), and working more myself
to be able to buy some luxury goods. In this paper we are going to focus on
this last reaction.
A number of studies, from Hirsch’s (1976) classical work to more recent
empirical investigations, point at the fact that the substitution process we in-
vestigate is indeed relevant in the real world. The analysis of its details and
causes, though, proves quite complex and there are at least a dozen of possible
explanatory factors that can be cited, including pressure on time, geographical
mobility, television, generational change, increased women’s labor force partic-
ipation rate, expansion of the welfare state, and the list could continue. For
instance, reﬂecting on the combination of private wealth and weak social sup-
port structure in the United States, Schiﬀ (1992) argues2:
The need to cope with the high degree of isolation caused by the higher
degree of geographic labor mobility may lead to the creation of alternative
institutions where people who are not as close can interact (e.g., singles’
bars, dating services, nursing homes, insurance, and so on). These market
activities enter into the gross national product (GNP) but do not neces-
sarily imply higher welfare than in societies where some of these functions
are carried out outside the market. (p.167-168)
The empirical analyses carried out to date indicate that four factors are
particularly relevant to explain the substitution process we focus on: Putnam
(2000), looking at the United States, emphasizes the role of television3 and of
generational shift (from the generation born between 1910 and 1940 character-
ized, in view of the particular historic conditions of the period, by a strong
sense of civic commitment, to the generation born after the Second World War,
much more individualistically oriented); Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) focus
2See also Schiﬀ (1999) for a general equilibrium model of labor mobility in the presence of
social capital and Schiﬀ (2002) for a model that points out the diﬀerence between trade and
migration as of factor mobility when social capital is considered.
3See also Corneo (2001), who shows clear empirical evidence that more time is spent
in front of the television in those countries in which people work harder, and explains this
evidence with a model based on relational goods, in which coordination failure may lead to a
Pareto-dominated ‘work and television’ equilibrium.
5prevalently on the importance of the increase of economic inequality and so-
cial heterogeneity; Costa and Kahn (2001) refer that the increased number of
working women also plays a key role.
We do not go deeper into the analysis of any of these aspects, but rather
take it for granted that there can be a relevant substitution process of activities
that yield private goods for activities that yield relational goods. In particu-
lar, we shall simply assume that non-subsistence needs may be either satisﬁed
by a relational good or by a luxury private good, and we shall distinguish be-
tween a ‘relational strategy’ and two ‘private strategies’: according to the ﬁrst
one, individuals devote much time to leisure and satisfy their non-subsistence
needs with the relational good, but cannot aﬀord the luxury good; according to
the other two ones, they work more and are thus able to consume the luxury
good; the diﬀerence is that in the ﬁrst ‘private strategy’ the luxury good is
consumed when young, whereas in the second one individuals save and accumu-
late capital when young in order to consume the luxury good when old. Both
of the latter two strategies protect individuals from the negative externalities
of a high average working time on social interaction, but while the ﬁrst one
oﬀers a better protection in the youth, the second one does it in the old age.
Their performance depends on the evolution of social participation over time,
which in turn depends on the adoption dynamics of the three strategies under
consideration. This interdependence generates phenomena of path dependence:
economies which are identical in terms of preference and technology, but with
diﬀerent past histories reﬂected in a diﬀerent initial distribution of the strate-
gies, can come to diﬀer radically at a social and economic level in terms of the
allocation of time between the private and the social sphere, and in terms of
capital accumulation.
3 The model
3.1 Preferences
We analyze the decision process of a continuum of (non-overlapping) generations
of individuals parameterized by s ∈ (0,+∞). Each generation s is formed by a
continuum of individuals that live for two periods: t = 0,1. In t = 0 they are
‘young’ and in t = 1 they are ‘old’. In each generation, individuals’ well-being
depends on four goods: leisure (1−lt), a subsistence private good (Pt), a luxury
private good (Qt) and a relational good (Rt). For simplicity we assume that the
relational good and the luxury good are perfect substitutes. Speciﬁcally, letting
r be the intertemporal discount rate and d the marginal rate of substitution
between Q and R, individual preferences are represented by the utility function
u = ln(1−l0)+lnP0+ln(R0+dQ0)+r{ln(1 − l1) + lnP1 + ln(R1 + dQ1)}. (1)
63.2 Technology
To keep the technology of this economy as simple as possible, we assume that
both private goods (P and Q) are produced with labor only when individuals
are young and with capital only when they are old. Moreover, capital is not
passed from one generation to the next one. The relational good is produced
with shared leisure and past relational good.
Given this technology, it is immediate to notice that individuals will not
work when old, rather devoting their entire time to leisure, i.e., l1 = 0.
3.3 Matching
The fact that the relational good is not a private good, but is rather jointly
produced and consumed through social interaction, is captured by assuming that
at birth individuals are randomly pairwise matched to play a one-shot game.
Such game determines consumption of relational good according to whether the
two interacting individuals devote much time to socially enjoyed leisure (thus
foregoing some private consumption), or work hard to increase their private
consumption, either when young or when old, but at the cost of a reduced leisure
and of enjoying less relational good. The details of the game are speciﬁed below.
Therefore, when they are young, individuals have to decide both upon the
allocation of their time between leisure and work and upon the patterns of
consumption and accumulation, since the part of private production that is
saved when young is used as capital to produce and consume new private goods
when old. For simplicity, we assume that individuals have to choose among
three pure strategies S1, S2, S3.
3.4 Strategies
3.4.1 Relational strategy (S1)
Following strategy S1, they work ‘little’ when young: l0(S1) = lL ∈ (0,1). By
working lL, they are not able to consume the luxury good, either when young or
when old. Rather, they just produce enough private goods to be able to satisfy
their subsistence needs, and for simplicity we assume that their subsistence
consumption is the same when young and when old: P0(S1) = P1(S1) = P4.
Their consumption of relational goods is not entirely determined by their own
strategy, but depends also upon the strategy of the individual j with whom
they are pairwise matched: we specify later how R0(S1,Sj) and R1(S1,Sj) are
determined.
4One can interpret the subsistence good as being the only one that can be accumulated as
capital and used in future production. In this case, individuals following strategy S1 would
be producing only the subsistence good when young (say, the amount Y L) and saving just
so much as to be able to produce and consume an equal amount of it when old (they save
KL = Y L − P, which yields again P at t = 1). Other interpretations are possible, but the
point is not really relevant.
7lL and P are parameters of the model which are considered as exogenously
determined. Moreover, without loss of generality we normalize P = 15.
3.4.2 Private ‘impatient’ strategy (S2)
Following strategy S2, individuals work ‘hard’ when young: l0(S2) = lH, with
0 < lL < lH < 1. By working lH, they are not only able to consume the quantity
P of the subsistence good both when young and when old, but they are also able
to increase their private consumption when young by consuming the quantity
Q0(S2) = Q of the luxury good. Such additional consumption leaves savings
(and therefore capital accumulation and subsistence consumption when old)
unchanged with respect to strategy S1. Relational goods when young and when
old, R0(S2,Sj) and R1(S2,Sj), will be speciﬁed later.
lH and Q are parameters of the model.
3.4.3 Private ‘patient’ strategy (S3)
Finally, by following strategy S3
6, individuals work ‘hard’ when they are young
(l0(S3) = lH), but, instead of consuming the the luxury good when young, they
rather save more and accumulate more capital in order to be able to increase
their private consumption when old. Speciﬁcally, in their old age they consume
the quantity Q1(S3) = Q of the luxury good7. Subsistence consumption is the
same as in strategies S1 and S2. Relational goods when young and when old
will now be R0(S3,Sj) and R1(S3,Sj).
3.5 Relational technology
We make two basic assumptions concerning the technology of joint production
and consumption of relational goods: ﬁrst, we assume that the amount of such
goods jointly produced and consumed is the same for the two interacting in-
dividuals; second, we assume that this amount depends positively upon two
factors: the quantity of time that the two interacting individuals are able to
spend together (in this case, their leisure time) and the ‘quality’ of their inter-
action, which is determined by the amount of past relational goods on which
5Observe that also the assumption that P0(S1) = P1(S1) is not restrictive, since our results
do not depend upon it: these assumptions are made just to make model more easily readable.
6Notice that the labels ‘impatient’ and ‘patient’ are used here just to distinguish between
a private strategy with low capital accumulation and one with high capital accumulation, re-
spectively: they should not be interpreted literally, since the utility function, and in particular
the discount rate r, are the same for everybody.
7This means that, paralleling the assumption about subsistence consumption, we are as-
suming that working hard allows to consume the quantity Q of luxury good, but individuals
are free to choose between consuming it when young, as in strategy S2, or when old, as in
strategy S3. It is immediate to extend all of our results, just we obvious adjustments in the
inequalities (3) to (7), to the case where this equality assumption does not hold: its only role
is to simplify notation.
8they can count8. Since before birth there is no interaction, when individuals
are young they cannot count on any past relational good; moreover, since no
individual works when old and they all devote their entire time to leisure, the
only determinant of the diﬀerences in consumption of relational goods when old
is the amount of relational goods enjoyed when young.
We translate these assumption into simple functional forms in the following
way. First, we write R1(Si,Sj) = δR0(Si,Sj), where δ is a positive parameter.
Second, calling ω > 0 the maximum amount of relational goods that may be
enjoyed by two interacting individuals when they are young, we assume that
R0(Si,Sj) = ω if Si = Sj = S1; R0(Si,Sj) = ω − α(lH − lL) if Si = S1 and
Sj ∈ {S2,S3}; and R0(Si,Sj) = ω − 2α(lH − lL) if Si,Sj ∈ {S2,S3}9.
α > 0 is a parameter that measures the negative externality on the relational
sector generated by the time spent at work over the minimum work time needed
to satisfy subsistence needs (for this reason the diﬀerence lH −lL enters in spite
of just lH). To simplify notation, we assume throughout that lH = 2lL and omit
the subscript by writing lL = l. This assumption has a possible and intuitive
interpretation in terms of part-time and full-time job, but in any case is not
crucial for our results.
3.6 Payoﬀs
We now have all the elements to ﬁll in the 3×3 payoﬀ matrix U, by substituting
into equation (1) the amount of all kinds of goods consumed, which depends
upon technology and the combination of own strategy and of the strategy fol-
lowed by the individual I am matched with: Uij = u(Si,Sj). This matrix is
S1 S2 S3
S1 A B B
S2 C D D
S3 E F F
,
A ≡ ln(1 −
l
2
) + lnω + rln(δω),
B ≡ ln(1 −
l
2
) + ln(ω − α
l
2
) + rln[δ(ω − α
l
2
)],
C ≡ ln(1 − l) + ln(ω − α
l
2
+ dQ) + rln[δ(ω − α
l
2
)],
D ≡ ln(1 − l) + ln(ω − αl + dQ) + rln[δ(ω − αl)],
E ≡ ln(1 − l) + ln(ω − α
l
2
) + rln[δ(ω − α
l
2
) + dQ],
F ≡ ln(1 − l) + ln(ω − αl) + rln[δ(ω − αl) + dQ].
8Notice that the time spent in socially enjoyed leisure serves here at the same time for
immediate consumption of the relational good and as a relation-speciﬁc investment whose
return is given by future consumption of the relational good.
9Because of our assumptions, observe that the matrix R0(Si,Sj)i,j=1,2,3 is symmetric.
9Observe that A > B, C > D, E > F.
3.7 Strategy adoption: replicator dynamics
Up to now we have not speciﬁed how individuals choose their strategies. We are
not interested in the solution to an individual maximization problem with full
rationality, but rather in the analysis of plausible patterns of behavior selection
at the social level. We take the view that, for a variety of reasons, individuals
belonging to a given generation may end up choosing either one of the three
strategies outlined above. Such reasons include the fact that it is often diﬃcult
to calculate ex ante all the consequences of the choices one makes when young,
the fact that social pressure may sustain social norms that induce to follow a
certain behavioral pattern, the fact that some decisions (especially concerning
social interaction with other people) are not taken instrumentally (i.e., they are
not taken on the basis of the calculation of their consequences, but rather on the
basis of some ‘intrinsic’ value they may have), and so on. But we also take the
view that more satisfactory strategies slowly spread over in society, for instance
because individuals are able to observe the choices of the previous generation
and to discern who fared well and who did not. Therefore, even though other
factors (for instance the desire to experiment, or the idea that the world has
changed) may induce some individuals to deviate from the strategy that turned
out to be most rewarding for the previous generation, imitation will drive more
individuals to embrace it than to leave it. According to this view, it is natural
to model the process of strategy adoption by the replicator dynamics.
Let therefore x1(s), x2(s), x3(s) be the proportion of individuals choos-
ing respectively strategies S1, S2, S3 in generation s ∈ (0,+∞). Thus, the
distribution of strategies x = (x1,x2,x3) belongs to the unitary simplex K = n
x ∈ <3 : x1,x2,x3 ≥ 0 and
P3
i=1 xi = 1
o
. We will denote by e1 = (1,0,0), e2 =
(0,1,0), e3 = (0,0,1) the vertices of K, where all agents adopt the same strategy
S1,S2,S3, respectively; and by Kij the edge of the simplex linking the vertices
ei and ej (obviously, Kij = Kji).
The (ex-ante) expected payoﬀ of strategy Si is:
ei · U · x =
3 X
j=1
Uijxj
and the average payoﬀ is:
x · U · x =
3 X
i=1
xiei · U · x =
3 X
i=1
3 X
j=1
Uijxixj
We assume that strategies which perform better than average are chosen
with increasing frequency at the expense of the less rewarding ones by new
generations. Speciﬁcally, by choosing s as time parametrization for the dynamics
across generations, and following Taylor and Jonker (1978), we assume that the
10rate of growth of the frequency of strategy Si is equal to the diﬀerence between
its expected payoﬀ an average payoﬀ:
dxi(s)
ds
= xi(s)[ei · P · x(s) − x(s) · P · x(s)] (2)
i = 1,2,3; where dxi(s)/ds is the derivative of xi(s) w.r.t. s (i.e., the derivative
w.r.t. ‘time’).
3.8 Properties of dynamics (2)
Under dynamics (2), both the simplex K and its edges are invariant, and its
vertices are ﬁxed points (see e.g. Weibull (1995)). We use Bomze’s (1983)
classiﬁcation to establish the main properties of dynamics (2). The details are
in Appendix. We summarize here our main ‘robust’ results, where by ‘robust’
we mean those results that hold but at most under a certain equality condition
on some parameters.
First, there are no attractive ﬁxed points in the interior of the simplex, as
well as there are none in the interior of the K23 edge. This means that the
dynamics cannot converge to a situation where each of the three strategies is
adopted by a positive fraction of the population, as well as it cannot converge to
a situation in which a positive fraction adopts the private ‘impatient’ strategy
S2 and the remainder (positive) fraction adopts the private ‘patient’ one S3, but
nobody adopts the relational strategy S1.
Second, while the vertices e2 and e3 cannot be simultaneously attractive,
either e1 and e2 or e1 and e3 can be simultaneously attractive. In other words,
it is possible to have two kinds of bistable dynamics, such that in the attrac-
tor everybody adopts the same strategy: in the ﬁrst one, depending on initial
conditions (i.e., on x(0)), all individuals may either end up adopting the rela-
tional strategy S1 or the private ‘patient’ strategy S3; in the second one, again
depending on initial conditions, all individuals may either end up adopting the
relational strategy S1 or the private ‘impatient’ strategy S2. Figure 1 illustrates
the ﬁrst case; ﬁgure 2 the second one.
11Figure 1
Figure 2
Figures 1 and 2 have been obtained with the following parameter values:
12in both of them Q = P = 20010, l = 6, α = 10, ω = 1000; in ﬁgure 1
r = 0.8, d = 2.5, δ = 0.6; in ﬁgure 2 r = 0.5, d = 2.955, δ = 1.12. The
change in the kind of bistable dynamics generated by this parameter change
has an intuitive interpretation: a higher impatience (a lower r) renders strategy
S3 (the private strategy with high capital accumulation) less satisfactory and
therefore decreases its chances of being selected under dynamics (2). Therefore,
higher impatience, accompanied in this case by the simultaneous increases in
the preference for luxury good over relational good (d) and in the dependence
of future relational good upon the ‘quality’ of existing relations (δ), lets the
attractor diﬀerent from e1 pass from being e3 to being e2, that is, we pass from
a situation in which everybody may end up adopting the private strategy with
high capital accumulation to one in which everybody may end up adopting the
private strategy with low capital accumulation.
Our third result is that there can be attractors (even global attractors) on
the edges K12 and K13, but not contemporaneously on both. This means that
the dynamics may lead to an equilibrium in which diﬀerent strategies coexist,
that is, a positive fraction of the population adopts the relational strategy S1
and the remainder (positive) fraction adopts either one (but the same for all)
of the two private strategies. Figure 3 illustrates the possible coexistence in the
attractor of S1 with the private ‘patient’ strategy S3 and ﬁgure 4 its possible
coexistence with the private ‘impatient’ strategy S2.
Figure 3
10Notice that the assumption P = 1 adopted in the text was just a normalization, so that
the numerical speciﬁcation is not in contrast with it.
13Figure 4
Figures 3 and 4 have been obtained with the following parameter values: as
in ﬁgures 1 and 2, in both of them Q = P = 200, l = 6, α = 10, but now
in both of them ω = 125, r = 0.8, d = 2.5, whereas in ﬁgure 3 δ = 0.3 and
in ﬁgure 4 δ = 0.6. Therefore, with respect to ﬁgure 1, ﬁgure 3 is obtained
by changing only one parameter, namely by reducing the maximum amount of
relational good obtainable ω. This obviously renders S1 less satisfactory and
therefore it is not surprising that e1 stops being a sink, but what is interesting is
to notice that also e3 is not a sink anymore, that is, even if the initial frequency
of private strategies is very high, under these parameters the relational strategy
will have a higher than average return and so will spread over, until a certain
balance between S1 and S3 is reached; at the same time, when the frequency
of S3 is low, it also performs better than average and spreads over, so that in
the attractive ﬁxed point we ﬁnd strategies S1 and S3 coexisting. Something
similar happens in ﬁgure 4 with strategies S1 and S2, and the only diﬀerence
with respect to ﬁgure 3 is that we now have a lower δ, i.e., a lower ‘productivity’
of present relational good in terms of future relational good.
What should be clear at this point is that which strategies perform better
than average, and therefore which ones spread over, is not a simple function of
either the parameters or the distribution of strategies, but rather depends upon
both. The two bistable dynamics show the possibility that structurally equal
economies end up with very diﬀerent patterns of consumption and accumula-
tion just because they diﬀer in the initial distribution of strategies. The two
dynamics with coexistence show that even when there is a unique attractor of
the dynamics, the population behavior need not be homogeneous, in the sense
14that we can observe very diﬀerent patterns of consumption and accumulation
across the population. The next question is therefore whether the ﬁxed point
to which the economy converges in each case is Pareto-eﬃcient or whether it is
dominated by another ﬁxed point.
Our fourth result concerns welfare comparisons among ﬁxed points of the
dynamics. In both cases of bistable dynamics (ﬁgures 1 and 2), the ﬁxed point
e1 Pareto-dominates the other attractor. This means that everybody would
be better oﬀ under the universal adoption of the relational strategy than un-
der the universal adoption of the private strategy that may be selected by the
dynamics. Therefore, if the initial frequency of the attractive private strategy
is suﬃciently high, individuals end up in a ‘poverty trap’ characterized by an
excess of work and private consumption and by poor relational interactions. If,
as it seems reasonable in many contexts, we assume that private goods enter
in the measured GDP but relational goods do not, then GDP in this case is
not a good measure of welfare: while welfare is higher when everybody follows
the relational strategy, GDP is higher when everybody follows one of the two
private strategies. Such ‘poverty trap’ is due to coordination failure: to escape
it, it would be suﬃcient that a high enough fraction of the population were able
to coordinate on the relational strategy, since then the rest of the population
would follow. Without coordination, what may happen is that individuals in
fact try to defend themselves from social poverty, i.e., from the fact that too
few other individuals follow the relational strategy, by devoting more time to
work in order to consume the luxury good which is a substitute of the relational
good. Notice that, while this behavior, although leading to a ‘low welfare trap’,
has clear implications in terms of labor oﬀer, and therefore private production
and income, its implications in terms of accumulation patterns may be of two
kinds: if the dynamics leads to e2, accumulation in equilibrium is low; if it leads
to e3, it is high.
In the two cases illustrated in ﬁgures 3 and 4, in which there is only one
attractive ﬁxed point, where the relational strategy coexists with one of the
private strategies, we still ﬁnd that the (now repulsive) ﬁxed point e1 Pareto-
dominates the attractor, but in this case the coordination problem is much more
severe than in the case of a bistable dynamics, since now, in order to reach e1,
the entire population should be able to coordinate on S1 at the same time, and
any deviation by a whatever small but positive fraction would lead again to the
Pareto-dominated coexistence equilibrium.
3.9 Policy implications
The coordination problem just outlined provides a clear rationale for policy in-
tervention. For instance, in the cases illustrated by ﬁgures 1 and 2, consider
an economy starting with such a distribution of strategies x(0) that it would
spontaneously end up in a ‘poverty trap’ with overwork: a policy of temporary
(i.e., for a generation) working time regulation that were able to induce a sig-
niﬁcant but less than one fraction of the population (let’s say the category of
workers to which the regulation applies) to work less and therefore embrace the
15relational strategy would be able to take the economy out of the trap, since the
rest of the population would then spontaneously follow. By contrast, the same
policy would turn out to be ineﬀective in the cases illustrated by ﬁgures 3 and 4,
since the temporary change would be reverted by next generations. Therefore,
while our model points at a clear scope for policy as a coordination device, it
also prevents from the temptation to reach simple conclusions that do not take
adequately into account the complexity of socio-economic interaction.
4 Conclusion
The model presented shows how the patterns of consumption and accumulation,
as well as the patterns of time allocation between private production and leisure,
and hence those of social interaction made possible by shared leisure, may be
the result of a process in which individuals try to ﬁnd their personal life strategy
by imitating the strategies that turned out to be most satisfactory for previous
generations and by experimenting some new ones. In such a process ‘social
pressure’ plays a key role, since which strategy is most satisfactory depends upon
the distribution of strategies in the population. Because of this reason, and since
the process may converge to diﬀerent equilibria, we ﬁnd path dependence in the
form of important critical mass eﬀects in the initial distribution of strategies.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the process may both converge to equilibria in which
the entire population adopts the same strategy, and to equilibria in which two
diﬀerent strategies coexist. We show several cases in which the dynamics leads
to ‘low welfare traps’ where individuals work and consume private goods at a
higher than eﬃcient rate, at the expenses of socially enjoyed leisure, and we
observe that in such cases GDP may not serve as a good welfare indicator, since
it does not take into account the welfare loss implied by a lower consumption of
relational goods. Finally, we argue that in some cases policy intervention may
take the economy out of a ‘low welfare trap’ if it succeeds to coordinate the
actions of a critical mass of individuals, but in other cases it cannot.
Let us conclude by considering two possible extensions of our setting. The
ﬁrst one is to consider the fact that the private consumption that substitutes
for the relational good, and that we here denoted for simplicity as ‘luxury’
consumption, might have negative external eﬀects on the relational good, for
instance through a reduction in the opportunity to meet other people at equal
levels of leisure. Preliminary simulations that take this eﬀect into account show
that in this case the dynamics may converge to an interior ﬁxed point, where
all of the three strategies considered here are present.
A second extension would be to consider the possibility to leave bequests
or to transfer capital from one generation to the next one. This would allow
to fully study the growth implications of our model, whereas, by assuming that
individuals are endowed with no capital at birth, we are able to properly discuss
accumulation patterns within one generation, but not growth patterns through
generations. It is clear that the two aspects are interconnected, and it is to
expect that the analogous to our ‘low welfare traps’ with overwork would be
16something like the possibility of dynamic ineﬃciency; but at the moment this is
just a supposition. It may be also interesting to enrich the model by taking into
account that relational activities may imply a short run cost in terms of output
and growth, but a long run beneﬁt, as the literature on social capital seems to
indicate; but this remains for future work.
Appendix
Proposition 1 Stability of e1
The ﬁxed point e1 has one eigenvalue positively proportional to the expression
C − A (in direction of the vector e1 − e2, that is, e1 − e2 is an eigenvector
corresponding to such eigenvalue) and one eigenvalue positively proportional to
the expression E − A (in direction of the vector e1 − e3).
C − A < 0 and E − A < 0 if and only if, respectively,
dQ <

1 − l
2

ω1+r
(1 − l)

ω − α l
2
r + α
l
2
− ω, and (3)
dQ < δ

 
 



1 − l
2

ω1+r
(1 − l)

ω − α l
2



1
r
+ α
l
2
− ω

 
 
. (4)
Proof The result is an application of Bomze (1983), Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Stability of e2
The ﬁxed point e1 has one eigenvalue positively proportional to the expression
B −D (in direction of the vector e2 −e1) and one eigenvalue positively propor-
tional to the expression F − D (in direction of the vector e2 − e3).
B − D < 0 and F − D < 0 if and only if, respectively,
dQ >

1 − l
2

ω − α l
2
1+r
(1 − l)(ω − αl)r + αl − ω, and (5)
1 +
dQ
ω − αl
>

1 +
dQ
δ(ω − αl)
r
. (6)
Proof The result is an application of Bomze (1983), Proposition 1.
Remark 1 Inequality (6) is always satisﬁed if δ ≥ 1; it is not satisﬁed if δ is
small enough.
Proposition 3 Stability of e3
The ﬁxed point e3 has one eigenvalue positively proportional to the expression
17B − F (in direction of the vector e3 − e1) and one eigenvalue positively propor-
tional to the expression D − F (in direction of the vector e3 − e2).
B − F < 0 if and only if
dQ > δ

  
  


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1 − l
2

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2
1+r
(1 − l)(ω − αl)
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

1
r
+ αl − ω
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  
  
. (7)
D − F < 0 if and only if inequality (6) holds with reversed sign.
Proof The result is an application of Bomze (1983), Proposition 1.
Recall that a ﬁxed point is locally attractive (a sink) if has two strictly
negative eigenvalues; it is repulsive (a source) if it has two strictly positive
eigenvalues; it is a saddle if it has a strictly positive eigenvalue and a strictly
negative one. Moreover, in the following we deﬁne ‘hyperbolic’ a ﬁxed point
that has both eigenvalues diﬀerent from zero.
Remark 2 The eigenvalues of e2 and e3 cannot be all contemporaneously strictly
negative. Therefore, while e1 and e3, as well as e1 and e2, can be contempora-
neously attractive, e2 and e3 cannot.
Proposition 4 Pareto-dominance among the vertices
If e1 and e2 are both hyperbolic sinks, e1 Pareto-dominates e2.
If e1 and e3 are both hyperbolic sinks, e1 Pareto-dominates e3.
Proof We prove here the ﬁrst part of the proposition (the proof of the second
part follows the same lines). e1 and e2 are both hyperbolic sinks if and only
if A > C,E and D > B,F. Since the payoﬀ matrix U satisﬁes A > B, C >
D, E > F, it follows that A > C > D, which proves the result since u(S1,S1) =
A > D = u(S2,S2).
Proposition 5 Fixed points on the edge K12
K12 is pointwise ﬁxed (that is, it is entirely constituted of ﬁxed points) if and
only if C − A = D − B = 0.
The interior of K12 contains a unique ﬁxed point if and only if
(C − A)(D − B) < 0. (8)
If neither inequality (8) nor the previous equality hold, then there are no
ﬁxed points in the interior of K12.
If inequality (8) holds, then the ﬁxed point in the interior of K12 has one
eigenvalue positively proportional to the expression A − C (in direction of K12)
and one eigenvalue positively proportional to the expression
(D − B)(E − A) − (C − A)(F − B)
D − B
. (9)
18Proof The result is an application of Bomze (1983), Proposition 2.
Remark 3 If inequality (8) holds, a necessary condition for the unique ﬁxed
point in the interior of K12 to be attractive is that both e1 and e2 have a strictly
negative eigenvalue in direction of e1−e2 (that is, inequalities (3) and (5) must
hold with reversed sign).
Proposition 6 Fixed points on the edge K13
K13 is pointwise ﬁxed if and only if E − A = F − B = 0.
The interior of K13 contains a unique ﬁxed point if and only if
(E − A)(F − B) < 0. (10)
If neither inequality (10) nor the previous equality hold, then there are no
ﬁxed points in the interior of K13.
If inequality (10) holds, then the ﬁxed point in the interior of K13 has one
eigenvalue positively proportional to the expression A−E (in direction of K13)
and one eigenvalue positively proportional to the expression
(C − A)(F − B) − (D − B)(E − A)
F − B
. (11)
Proof The result is an application of Bomze (1983), Proposition 2.
Remark 4 If inequality (10) holds, a necessary condition for the unique ﬁxed
point in the interior of K13 to be attractive is that both e1 and e3 have a strictly
negative eigenvalue in direction of e1−e3 (that is, inequalities (4) and (7) must
hold with reversed sign).
Moreover, if in the interior of both K12 and K13 there exists a unique ﬁxed
point, they cannot be both hyperbolic sinks11.
Proposition 7 Pareto-dominance along the edges K12 and K13
e1 Pareto-dominates any ﬁxed point in the interior of the edges K12 and K13,
independently of their respective stability.
Proof In any ﬁxed point in the interior of the edge K12 (respectively, K13)
the expected payoﬀ of strategy S1 must be equal to the expected payoﬀ of
strategy S2 (respectively, S3). Since the expected payoﬀ of strategy S1 reaches
its maximum value A in e1 and is strictly lower outside of it, we have proved
the result.
Proposition 8 Fixed points on the edge K23
K23 is pointwise ﬁxed if and only if D = F.
If D 6= F, there are no ﬁxed points in the interior of K23.
Proof The result is an application of Bomze (1983), Proposition 5.
11To see this, observe that (8) and A − C < 0 imply D − B < 0, that (10) and A − E < 0
imply F − B < 0, and that therefore expressions (9) and (11) have opposite sign, since they
both have a negative denominator while their numerators are the opposite of one another.
19Proposition 9 Fixed points in the interior of K
If (C − A)(F − B) 6= (D − B)(E − A), there are no ﬁxed points in the interior
of the simplex K (that is, there are no ﬁxed points where the three strategies
S1, S2, S3 all coexist).
If (C −A)(F −B) = (D−B)(E −A), there exist ﬁxed points in the interior
of the simplex K, but they are not isolated. In particular, if (C − A)(F − B) =
(D−B)(E −A) = 0, there exists a segment of ﬁxed points in the interior of K;
if (C −A) = (F −B) = (D −B) = (E −A) = 0, the entire simplex is pointwise
ﬁxed.
Proof The result is an application of Bomze (1983), Proposition 6.
Remark 5 In the same way as we proved the result on the Pareto-dominance
along the edges, one easily proves that e1 Pareto-dominates any ﬁxed point in
the interior of K.
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